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A

De Facto New

Discussion

Federalism and
New England:

37
Using John Shannons paper as a broad frame of reference (see previous article), a
panel discussion titled "The Changing Nature of Federal I State Relations: The Fiscal

Impact on

New England" took place on

18

November 1985

at the University

of Mas-

John W. McCormack
Institute of Public Affairs and was presented in a roundtable forum. The members of
the panel were Kenneth Curtis, former governor of Maine; Chester Atkins, member

sachusetts at Boston. The discussion was sponsored by the

of Congress from the Massachusetts Fifth Congressional District; Richard Licht,
lieutenant governor of Rhode Island; David Walker, professor of political science

at

of Connecticut and former assistant director of the Government Structure and Function Section, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations;
and Roger Porter, professor of government and business at the John F. Kennedy
School of Government and former special assistant to President Reagan. The followthe University

ing are excerpts from their remarks.

KENNETH CURTIS: The

concept of new federalism

around for a short period of time. We've
years.

It's

frequently had different

those of us

who have

really

isn't

something

been talking about

that's

it

for a

been

number of

and it's been promoted in different ways. For
government it has had one very clear definition,

titles

served in state

which is that the federal government will authorize and support many types of
governmental assistance. So-called de facto new federalism simply means that the
states, the municipalities, will

begin to pay a

much

bigger share for those particular

programs.
I

remember

well that block grants were

attractive to the states.

And

that's

among

the

first

propositions that sounded

because the states understood what their

own

indi-

We would receive a
amount of money and would spread it throughout our states in the most efficient way. But the problem was that under the block grant program, we never were
going to get back as much as we were getting in categorical grants.
When I was governor of Maine, governors supported very fully, and on a bipartisan basis, the concept of general revenue sharing. I think that was the first time we
began to realize that governors had any power at all in this country. General revenue
sharing was not especially liked by Congress. Many members of Congress much preferred the categorical grant program because they could take credit directly with the

vidual needs were far better than the federal government did.
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voters for that kind of support; and governors got a

little bit

of relief in not having to

approach the legislature quite so heavily for the taxes required to do the many things
that were needed. In Maine, general revenue sharing did a tremendous amount of
good, because those funds were dedicated directly to the support of public education

and to a very large degree helped stabilize what was becoming a runaway escalation
of property tax. So from my vantage point, that was one of the best types of new federalism we had seen, if you want to call it that.
But you know, new federalism to

me

has always been sold as a sugar-coated

pill. It

always carried a bigger burden for the states and municipalities. President Reagan,

even since his days as governor of California, has been a proponent of new federalism.

38

think he's succeeded, certainly, but probably

I

cept of de facto

new

federalism, as

John Shannon

more

called

in bringing
it

about the con-

in the title of his paper.

It's

been a new de facto federalism simply because there are no longer enough federal dollars to

go around. One of the things that concerns

me

is

the argument put forward at

times by the administration that the federal government has very large and record
deficits,

Most

whereas the

states

states are not

running

deficits.

have a constitutional provision that

Of course,

will

there's a big difference.

not allow them to run deficits

and that forces balanced budgets. But we all need to remember that the federal
government is still taking the lion's share of the taxing power in this country, leaving
an increasingly small amount of room to maneuver at the municipal and state levels.
There's another factor that gets involved, and this is where politics rears its rather

who wants

blamed for raising the taxes. Certainly Congress doesn't want that distinction, and the states don't want it either. We
shove it down until it hits the municipalities, where either the programs have to be cut
or our own taxes have to be raised. It's a hard point to get across from any governmental level
that the great middle class are the taxpayers and it just depends on
which pocket they're going to take their money from. I know during my days in
Maine we believed very strongly that we should not discuss the state budget by itself,
that we ought to be discussing municipal and state budgets collectively so that the
taxpayers better understood what price they were going to be paying. We wanted to
extract their tax dollars in the most fair, efficient, and progressive way we could, and
we wanted the taxpayers to know what we were doing.
Turning very quickly to Maine and the current situation, Maine is going to face
many, many severe problems, one of which is the loss of revenue sharing. Our property taxes are again getting very nearly out of control. We've had such appreciation in
property values that individuals have seen their property taxes rise to an extent that is

ugly head:

it's

the question of

to get

—

almost confiscatory.
will

When we

lose federal revenue sharing,

bounce back to municipal taxpayers, money

that's

about $33 million a year

been taking the form of aid to

public education. Also, the municipalities are going to continue to be hit very, very
heavily as aid continues to dwindle for

human

service programs.

We

don't know, of

what the final budget's going to be, but we have many estimates which indicate that Maine will lose between 10 and 12 percent of its general fund through federal cuts. John Shannon indicated another factor that's very serious to us in Maine,
which is that our state is thirty-ninth in the nation in per capita personal income.
Thirty percent of the total state budget is in federal funds. And Maine is one of the
states that receives a dollar for every 61 cents it sends to Washington. Whether we call
they're hurtit new federalism or not
I prefer to call it federal economic policies
course,

—

ing us in

many

other ways as well.

—

in

some very good news. The

However, there

is

government. In

fact,

innovation

municipalities are the only

game

now

I

at the state level,

But the
think

and

is

in

states are the innovative areas

today

so lacking at the federal level that the states and

town. So we're getting a

lot

of talented people

think they're doing a tremendous job against great odds.

My only disagreement with John

states can't act alone.

Shannon

is

that

I

going to get worse.

it's

want to disagree very strongly with the gloom and doom of the
previous speaker and of John Shannon.
I think what's happened is that a concept of a stronger centralized federal
government the old federalism, if you will was established fifty years ago, and it
worked. The old federalism was driven essentially by four things. The first was that
the federal government had a sense that it had to be more active in the economy and
in the social structure. It had the direct access to income taxation which most states
didn't have. What's happened now, very clearly, is that the federal government does
not have any flexibility in the taxation area, and the places where we have the greatest ability to tax, personal income and corporate income, are exactly the taxes that
have the worst impact on our international competitive position. So we have a situation in which taxing authority and taxing flexibility have shifted from the federal
government to the state governments. The tax revolt started with Proposition 13 in

CHESTER ATKINS:

I

—

—

California, but the states are

now

limit the taxing authority of state

resisting that. You're not seeing

and

local governments.

When

new measures

to

such measures are

put on the ballot, they're defeated.

The second thing that drove the old federalism was civil rights. Because the South,
in particular, was so segregated fifty years ago, it was important for resources to be
directed by the federal government, and this became increasingly important in the sixties simply to ensure that minorities had equal access to these programs. Now the
only attorney general in the United States and

than Attorney General Meese

problems there since everyone
the states that
that are

more

made up

is

in

is

Guam, and

its

territories

that's

who

is

less aggressive

because they have no

civil rights

of the same ethnic origin, except for the tourists. All

the Solid South are the very states with laws

aggressive than the federal government.

Not just

on

the

books

their practices or their

attorneys general, but the state laws themselves.

The

was that the federal government could
create an equalization of resources between rich states and poor states. There were
massive disparities in median income, particularly in the Deep South and the industrial Northeast. But today, most of the economic disparity occurs within states. It's
hard to think of a state in the country that's an economic basket case
there isn't
third concept behind the old federalism

—

one. But there are regions within very wealthy states that are extremely poor.

And

was more activist than the states, only the federal government
had the civil service traditions and the administrative capacity to run domestic programs. Well, that's no longer the case. There isn't a state in the country that doesn't
have more of a capacity to run them than the federal government, which virtually has
declared war on all of these programs. People on the federal level who are running
the programs are the same people who want to abolish them. That's their stated
finally, since

it

objective.

So

the question really

think the

first

thing

is,

we do

how do we

is

give

get

beyond the paralysis that we are

up and stop clinging

to

in?

I

our notion of the old feder-

50
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we recognize that state and local governments are a tremendous sucThey have built the administrative capacity, the commitment in terms of

alism. Second,
cess story.

and economic opportunity, and they've left the federal government in
the dust, frankly, particularly under the present administration. The thing that's shackling their ability to meet the unmet needs in their jurisdictions is twofold. One is federal regulation. Many of the regulations that we put on the books to protect essentially poor people and localities are now inhibiting any kind of innovation for
social justice

meeting new problems.

on

regulations

some of the

AFDC is a case in point.

AFDC simply serve to

The

keep people

federal laws

in poverty.

We

and the federal
should look at

mandates that are restricting flexibility and creativity on the part
We do have to be very sure that we maintain the protections that people have had historically, and that we maintain civil rights protection. State and local governments
all fifty of them
aren't always going to be more
progressive than the federal government. They certainly will continue to be more flexible and more capable of meeting changing situations.
federal

of state and local governments.

4n

—

—

I

think

we

also need to take a look at

that are administered

some of those

and coordinated better on the

federal domestic expenditures

state level.

For

instance, the

—

highway system we've already built it. Other than basically maintaining
certain uniform national traffic safety features, which, frankly, it does very poorly
now, the federal government ought to get out of that business entirely and return all
the gas tax to the states. Then the states could meet their real transportation priorities. The huge federal highway administration bureaucracy could be eliminated, and
the federal government would stop forcing on states crazy projects that they would
never build with their own money but do build because they can do it with a ten-cent
interstate

dollar

— money they don't get unless they build the particular project the Federal

Highway Administration and Congress want.
I could go on and on, but the key is that we ought to cut the states loose from their
from some of them, anyway and allow them to be more creative.
federal shackles
give
We ought to
them revenue sources for things that are best done on the state
level; and we ought to ensure that there's a national policy for income support for
that the federal government indeed provides some kind of social safety
everyone

—

—

—

and income maintenance. We should ensure that there are
uniform federal standards for that, which, by the way, do not currently exist. We
net, especially in nutrition

should

make

certain that environmental standards are met. If

continue to evolve as they have been evolving in the past

we allow

fifty years, I

the states to

think we'll see a

flowering of the kinds of programs and the kinds of innovation that anybody

At the same time well see civil
protected, and environmental concerns protected, and well be able at the fed-

believes in
rights

who

an

eral level to

activist

government would

cope with the

like to see.

deficit.

Frankly, the most destructive thing contributing to the present paralysis

is

that the

Democrats are clutching onto the teeny piece of the federal government that constitutes domestic programs, and in return for that, on the deals we make on the budget
resolution, we allow for huge increases in defense expenditures. And if we didn't have

we could force the cuts we need in defense expenditures. This
would give us the credibility we need to increase federal revenues to deal with the
deficit and allow the states to do the kinds of things they do so well with the domestic
to bargain in this way,

programs.

RICHARD

LICHT: The debate on this subject reminds me of the story of the man
who was drowning in the Potomac River about fifty feet from shore while on the
sidelines were standing two congressmen. One was a Democrat and the other was a
Republican. And both of them were conscientious public servants and wanted to help
this drowning man. The Republican had a life preserver with a twenty-five-foot-long
rope and threw it out, saying, "I want to help this man, but I believe if he's going to
be saved he also has to try to help himself." The Democrat took a life preserver with
a hundred feet of rope and threw it far out over the drowning man's head and said, "I
also want to help this man, but I have to run off now to do another good deed." I
think that what's happening in Washington is that no one wants to address the problem of the drowning man. I think they're using a misnomer, or perhaps even a
euphemism, when they talk about the new federalism. It's really just an abdication by
the federal government of any responsibility whatsoever for fashioning any solution
to today's social problems that we around the country are dealing with on a day-today basis. The reality is that we have to deal with that situation.
We've talked a lot about the budget, but there's a second issue that has to be discussed in terms of its effect on the states, and that's tax reform. I don't know whether

we

will or

we won't have tax reform, but they

talk

about

And the elimination of
me won't happen, is still out

it.

the state and local tax deduction, which everyone assures

on the table. If that happens, it will have a very grave impact on the economic
development plans of a number of states. I know it will in Rhode Island and Massachusetts and many other Northeastern states. But speaking of tax reform, very few
people are talking about the changes in tax-exempt bond financing and what these
there

changes are going to do.

If

passed in Treasury

2, they're

going to eliminate

many

of

the tax-exempt financing plans that have been used in the states for years, including

water treatment plants, plans for solid waste disposal, and health and education plans
in

our hospitals and schools, both public and private. Those institutions

forced to raise

money

an impact both on

The other point

or borrow

state

and

money

local

that concerns

at

much

will

be

higher interest rates, which will have

governments.

me

a great deal and that no one wants to talk about

Washington with regard to passing budget bills. We're
now two months into the current budget season and only one of the thirteen approis

the process that goes

priation

bills

necessarily

on

in

has even been passed in Congress. The budget resolution really doesn't

mean anything

until they pass the appropriation bills.

local levels are trying to plan

our budgets

in

advance

We

at the state

in a timely, sensible

and

manner,

and we have no idea what the federal government will or won't cut this year or even
in future years. This uncertainty about the budget is plaguing state and local governments, and Congress just doesn't want to pay a lot of attention to the problem. I wish
they'd at least make their decisions so we could plan properly and be as resilient as
the prior speakers say

we

are.

Another concern I have is with regard to what Congress is going to do after it gets
out of dispensing money. Since there'll be no more money to dispense, is Congress
then going to get into traditional state functions and start passing all sorts of laws telling us how to run our state governments and our state societies? That is a fear I have,
being a former legislator. It's nice to go back to your constituents and say you got
some legislation passed. Congressmen and senators could come back and say, I got
this federal

money

for

you and

that federal

money

for you. Well, they're not going to

41
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much anymore,

sorts of areas?

so are they going to

Areas that were traditional

tection, insurance industries

—

will

now become

the

come back and

state functions

start regulat-

— consumer pro-

domain of congressmen who need

banking area already.

to run for reelection. They're in the

Another issue I'd like to raise is the question of what really is being cut when you
about the budget cuts. I agree with John Shannon that we should protect the
most indigent people we have in this country and continue the programs we have for
them. The problem is that the only federal programs this leaves to cut are those
which have benefited the middle class. Since that's where the bulk of the votes are,
cuts in these programs are going to create problems for state government. Also, a lot
of those programs are urban mass transportation programs, which benefit people in
the entire economic spectrum. Economic development programs such as UDAGs
(Urban Development Action Grants) and Community Economic Development
Grants are all going to go by the wayside, undoubtedly, and they have been very
helpful to the states in promoting economic development and helping to bring about
some of the good times we've had over the past several years.
I want to close by reiterating a point that's been made about the states being laboratories. That's not a new concept. It was Justice Brandeis who first used the term,
many years ago. At that time the states were enacting imaginative labor laws, like the
prohibition of child labor, and they frequently came to the Supreme Court for decision. In Rhode Island, we've led the nation in deinstitutionalization of both the mentally retarded and the mentally ill. I visited a program in Newport for mentally ill
people who were no longer institutionalized. They were living in community homes,
and the people who ran the program were trying to get them jobs and were succeeding, especially in the tourist industry. The problem, however, was getting the people
to be willing to work, because if they did go to work, their entire support structure
was pulled out from under them. They lost their SSI, their Social Security, their food
stamps, their housing assistance, and everything else. And if they went to the job and
just didn't make it, they couldn't go back on SSI, because you have to show that
you're totally incapacitated in order to collect SSI. And if you held a job, even if it
was only for a couple of weeks, the assumption is made that you're able to get a job
and can get another one. So these people were fearful of going out into the community. Again, it was the federal regulations that were preventing what was not just an
innovative state program but really an innovative private program from working.
So these are some of my thoughts. We who are on the firing line in the states are
ready to assume the burden, but we need to be given some indication of which way
we're going. Then we'll have to handle it for better or worse.
talk

42

DAVID WALKER: What
vious speakers said.
in

some

I

I'm going to say will differ somewhat from what the pre-

think

stage of murkiness,

moment would appear

many
if

of the trends that have been discussed here are

still

not total ambivalence. The overriding theme at the

one has also to look at where this
fits into the overall system. I use three factors at the present time to gauge things.
grants and aid, programs, interOne's the operational, of which fiscal matters
to be the fiscal one, [but]

governmental administration

— are

—

all

a part.

The second, given

activism of this presumably conservative Court,
gressional tendency to preempt.
skill

and the

ability of state

and

The
local

third factor

is

is

the extraordinary

the constitutional, legal, and conthe political/ representational, the

governments and

their elected officials to effec-

Washington, compared to what they could have

tively represent their positions in

done twenty-five years ago.
Starting with the operational and looking at the fiscal

component of that,

there's

no way to deny the receding of the high level of federal aid as a proportion of state
compared to almost
and local revenue
as John Shannon highlighted all too well
which
the
high-water
mark. At the
recent
past,
back
to
was
1978,
any point in the
same time, when you reach 23 percent, which we did as of 1983-84, you're no farther
back than we were in the middle Nixon years in terms of federal aid as a proportion
which is to say we're not back to Johnson, and
of total state and local revenues
we're nowhere near Herbert Hoover. Deficits, I think, are the overriding politics in
Washington at the present time, but despite that, if the scenario that was forecast in
the fall of 1981 had been played out, the present figure for federal aid, for fiscal '85,
would have been in the area of $61 billion, rather than $107 billion, as it was. To put
it differently, in '82, '83, and '84, the Congress presented the president with a series of
appropriation bills on the order of $7, $8, and $9 billion greater than what he asked
for, and he signed all of them. This year may be different, but the previous three
years would indicate that there's a capacity even in a period of retrenchment, even in
some would say it
a period of deficit politics, to achieve a certain very slow increase
was static in terms of constant dollars but it was about a 5 percent real dollar

—

—

—

—

—

increase in fiscal '85 over

'84.

—

programmatic dimension of the operational factor namely, the
programs themselves there's been no repeal of any of the Johnson major programs
throughout the entire period. None of them have been repealed. We've had a merger
of some seventy-seven-odd, rather pitifully small categorical and two block grants
into nine block grants. We had the elimination of some sixty-odd categorical programs, largely in education and somewhat in economic development in the multistate
area. But there has been no major abandonment. In fact, the figures for Medicaid,
AFDC, and food stamps are all greater now, in terms of total dollar volume, than
they were in 1981 or in the last year of Carter. So that must be kept in mind to get
some perspective on this. Paradoxically, we've got thirteen block grants now, as
against the old five that we had as of 1980. Thirteen, plus general revenue sharing,
and the total of that amount comes to something like 18 percent of federal aid at the
moment. As of '83 and '84 the total proportion of federal aid bypassing state
government and going directly to cities and counties still aggregated 22 percent, the
same figure as in the last year of Mr. Carter. Now, I'm not undermining in any way
the thesis that there's obviously been a slowdown in the growth of aid. But to picture
a total devolution from the figures that have been presented misses the mark, I think,
If

one looks

at the

—

significantly.

The second area is the legal, the constitutional/ regulatory. And if one analyzes
input from the high Court and Congress and the administration in this area, one
knows,

I

think, that the state

and

than they were a decade or even

local people are in a far poorer, far

five years ago. There's

the

weaker position

been no modification

in the

Court since 1923. The constitutional context is one in
which the role of the federal government to allocate resources is preeminent. This
power is reflected in Massachusetts v. Mellon, which is still the law of the land and

entire position in the high

'

which says that Congress can append any conditions

Supreme Court,

in last year's Garcia decision,

government to determine

local aid.

2

it

wants to a grant made. The

affirmed the power of the federal

.-
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to the third factor

— the political/ representational factor. In the Gar-

on the Court held that the states and municipalities, through
the use of their lobbying powers, were amply protected by the existing political processes to get what they needed. As far as the high Court is concerned, the capacity of
cities and counties and states and school districts to lobby in Washington
in short,
the strength of the representational components of federalism to be within the very
and the fact that they can get grants from the
bowels of the national government
national government, is all evidence that the states and localities are amply protected
cia case, the majority

—

—

within the political processes of our national system. In fact,

the public interest

all

groups, the governors and the legislators, the mayors, the county

school districts
dy

j

— and perhaps New England generally — they

all

officials,

and the

are very well organ-

And, I would add, they had better be, because the array of interests that are
Washington has multiplied by a factor of at least six. And neither the economic nor the social nor the business lobbies are particularly sensitive to the interests
of state and local government. The outcome of decisions in Washington, I would
argue, at the present time, is in large measure a product of the interest-group-laden
process that constitutes our national policy process. As a result, even though they are
well organized, states and localities are at more of a disadvantage than they've ever
ized.

now

in

been

in the political/ representational area.

So

the picture

is this.

The

states are

weaker

in the political/ representational area

but in an operational sense they're more or

and

in the constitutional/ regulatory area,

less

holding their own. This only reiterates what John Shannon and others have said.

The extraordinary capacity of this

combined with the very difficult
circumstances of states and localities generally, indicates a resourcefulness and a resilience to countermand and in some respects to thwart the efforts of Washington in the
past four or five years. The capacity of certain state legislatures and governors to join
in complementing, supplementing, and making up for certain kinds of cuts
a trend
not including
indicates a kind of strength that a lot of us
that started back in 1981
myself felt was not there.
So the picture is mixed. The political processes in this country haven't changed
very much. The only thing that's changed in a significant degree is the deficit question. And there is an attitude among state and local people that you can't go to
Washington to solve all your problems. I think they knew that even in terms of midand Garcia above all
dle to late Carter. But beyond that, the constitutional issue
else, I would say
puts the localities in a new position vis-a-vis the high Court of the
country and the orbit of the United States Constitution.
particular period,

—

—

—

—

—

—

ROGER PORTER:
fessor of

mine

It's

a great experience for

me

to

sit

in the

presence of a former pro-

— Sam Beer — who has forgotten more about federalism than

I

ever

learned.
I

don't

come

full

discussion today

walking

of answers to what seems to be the central preoccupation of our

— the federal budget. I'm reminded of the story of the lion who was

down the jungle path, asking each of the animals in turn, "Who is the king
And the animals responded very deferentially, "Why, you are, sir."

of

the jungle?"

and he asked, "Who is the king of the jungle?"
And the elephant responded by picking up the lion in his trunk, whirling him around
his head, and dashing him against a tree. Whereupon the lion got up, deeply hurt and
Finally the lion

came

to the elephant,

bedraggled, and said, after he had slinked a safe distance

down

the jungle path, "Well,

you

mad just

didn't have to get

But

let

because

most

I

me remind you

am

convinced

'cause

you

didn't

know

the answer."

of a couple of dimensions of the problem that

it is

the most urgent problem

on our

platter

we

face,

and the one

relevant to our discussion. In the year 1980, the federal budget, as measured by

outlays, increased at

increase that

an annual rate of

we have

17 percent.

This was the most dramatic rate of

ever had at any time in our nation's fiscal history.

And

it

was

had continued for a decade, with the federal government assuming more and more responsibility and growing larger and larger. Federal
revenues, which were increasing dramatically, were being driven by two factors. First,
bracket creep, which we had always had with the progressive income tax
the kind
of bracket creep off the personal income tax which generated 1 .6 dollars in federal
revenues for every dollar growth in nominal GNP. During 1979 and 1980 we had, for
the first time in our nation's history, back-to-back years of double-digit inflation. The
Consumer Price Index from January 1979 to December 1980 in that twenty-fourmonth period increased by more than 25 percent. Coupled with that were already
legislated Social Security tax increases, which were going to push federal revenues as
a share of our gross national product to close to 23 percent. This compared with the
characteristic of a pattern that

—

—

—

average federal take of 19 percent of

GNP in terms

of revenues for the decades of the

and the seventies. The great debate in Washington at that time was not about
whether we would have a tax cut
both parties were committed to it, as was the
Congress
but about what the size of the cut would be. We had what someone once
described as an overshooting of the mark in 1981, where a proposal advanced by an
sixties

—

—

administration interested in reducing federal revenues was Christmas-treed by a Congress anxious to get in

swoop

to 17 percent of

on the

GNP.

act,

and we took federal revenues down

In the past four years

we have had four

in

one

fell

federal tax

which have brought federal revenues today as a share of GNP to the exact
level that they averaged during the sixties and seventies, that is, 19.0 percent of GNP.
Now let's look at what happened on the spending side of the budget. During the
sixties and the seventies, two important phenomena occurred with respect to the fedincreases,

eral budget.

The

first is

ing the early 1960s, in the
eral

we cut
Kennedy

that

in half

our share of

administration,

budget and 9.9 or roughly 10 percent of our

GNP devoted to defense.

we were devoting

Dur-

half of the fed-

GNP to defense expenditures.

During those two decades we took federal defense spending, as a share of the federal
we took it as a share of GNP down to 5.1 percent.
The second dramatic thing that happened during those decades with respect to the
federal budget is that we had a veritable explosion of federal spending on entitlement
programs, largely with respect to income transfer payments to individuals for Social
Security, disability, Medicare, and so forth, and an explosion in federal domestic
spending, in which the budget more than doubled. Today we have replaced that set of
budget priorities in the federal government with a reordering toward defense and a
reduction in federal domestic discretionary spending; and we have plateaued entitlements at a much higher level.
So the picture looks something like this. Two growing parts of the federal budget:
first, defense, which has gone from 5.1 percent of GNP up to 6.6. We're not back to
10, we're not even halfway back there, but we're up to 6.6, so we've added about 1.5
percent of GNP to defense spending. Second, the biggest growth by far in the federal
budget is nonprogrammatic. It's federal
net federal interest on the debt. That has
gone from $49 billion a year in absolute terms in 1980 to $130 billion today, reprebudget, to below 25 percent, and

—

,<-
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senting over 13 percent of the federal budget. In 1965, net federal interest payments

were

1.3

percent of

GNP.

In 1975 they were 1.7 percent, and today, as the fastest

growing part of the federal budget, they're 3.4 percent of GNP and rising. So between
defense, where we've added 1.5 percent of GNP, and interest payments on the debt,

where we've added almost 2 percent of
spending

at

GNP,

38 percent of the federal budget

with a plateau of federal entitlement

— about 9.5 percent of GNP — we've had

a big cut in federal domestic discretionary spending.

We

do anything about net interest in the short term; that's 3.4 percent. If you
don't allow for any more growth in defense and you leave it at 6.6 percent, the two of
those add up to 10 percent of GNP. And unless you're prepared to go in and whack
away at entitlements this is AFDC, food stamps (more than we have already),
Social Security, disability, Medicare, and you assume that you can contain Medicare
where it is
you've added another 9.5 percent of GNP. If the federal government did
nothing else just paid the interest on the debt, kept defense at current levels, and
federal entitlement program spending— you're at 19.5 percent of GNP without anything else. Now the situation in fact is that we're spending 24.8 percent of GNP and
we're taking in 19. That means we're currently running deficits today for fiscal '85 of
5.8 percent of GNP. At the same time, we have states that have shown the resilience
John Shannon talked about states that have made the difficult decisions, that have
put their fiscal houses in remarkable order. It is truly amazing to see what many
states have done in view of the fiscal situation they have faced. We now have states in
can't

—

46

—
—

—

the aggregate running a surplus of something like $34 to $40 billion. Others here

know

the figures

much more

precisely than

I

do. But

it is

truly

remarkable what has

happened.

Now

want to leave with you two thoughts, in addition to my simple conviction
that there is no more food at the federal trough, only deficits. I think it's mindboggling if you step back for a minute and think of the federal government having
I

when it is running budget
sharing money with entities which in the

persisted with general revenue sharing as long as
deficits

on the order of $200

billion a year,

it

has

aggregate are running surpluses. But putting that aside, the two thoughts are as follows.

The

first

one has been alluded to by other speakers. There

is

an almost

instinc-

on the part of policymakers, when you are pulling out or cutting spending programs, to try to accomplish the same objectives through other means, and the
principal alternative means is through mandating or regulating the activity. The

tive reaction

explosion in federal regulation that has occurred over the past ten years

in part the

is

result of various attempts to cope with this budget situation. This was not the

first

administration to discover that federal spending was racing ahead at rates and levels
that were unsustainable.

And

I

think this accounts to a great extent for the direction

—

and the executive branch and the courts have moved in
as we
have heard discussed today
that is, into spending more and more time and devoting
more and more effort to telling states what to do. I view that as an unfortunate
development. We have in the White House an individual who spent eight years of his
life running a state government, who believes very strongly in the capacities of state
governments, and who, while he is able to devote only a fraction of his time to such
constantly urged federal
matters, has
in the instances where I have been present
officials to adopt measures that would be less intrusive in terms of telling states what
to do. I think the appointment of Otis Bowen, the former governor of Indiana, as
that the Congress

—

—

—

and human services, resulted largely from the president's realization that this is one of the federal agencies that does the most in the way of regulating
the states, and he wants someone in there who's sympathetic to his belief that the federal government ought to be playing a less intrusive role. The second and last thought
I would like to share with you is that I am convinced, as is David Walker and, I
guess, all of the previous speakers, that individuals and institutions more frequently
secretary of health

than not underestimate their capacity to
for this

phenomenon, which we

with which

we

are associated,

is

see in

that

make adjustments and

our personal

change. The reason

lives as well as in the institutions

most change and adjustment

is

inconvenient,

and often difficult. And therefore we tend to resist it, especially if we believe there is
an alternative. Our forum today suggests that there is now no alternative but to bring
papered over for the past few years by a tremendous inflow
the federal fiscal crisis
of foreign capital from abroad
to an end, and that people recognize this. And we

—

will

—

not bring this about without a good deal of change and adjustment and some

sacrifice.

On

that

happy

note, I'm delighted to conclude

my

remarks.

Notes
1

.

2.

Massachusetts

v.

Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 1923.

For an explanation of the Garcia decision, see
ism:

Phase

II?"

by John Shannon.

p.

33 of the previous article, "De Facto

New Federal-

